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 NATIONAL SECURITY LAW: MORE QUESTIONS 
THAN ANSWERS 
HON. DAVID B. SENTELLE* 
 The terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, 
the reactions to those attacks, and more recently the armed conflict 
in Iraq have raised, or more accurately raised anew, a host of ques-
tions concerning the law of national security. Because I think the bar 
and especially the bench and the legal academy should be thinking 
about those questions, I am going to raise many of them for your 
thoughts and discussion, but I will not attempt to answer very many 
of them, both because the answers may not be fixed, and because I 
want to retain the openness necessary to deal with them should I 
confront them in an Article III context. Nonetheless, I want to offer 
them up for your consideration. The first question: Is national secu-
rity law really law?1 Many cynical students and observers of law and 
politics would say no. That is, they would assert that what we call 
national security law is simply a fig leaf, or a collection of fig leaves 
to cover whatever the political branches decide to do in the name of 
national security or national defense, hiding the fact that national 
security law is really not law at all. Moreover, cynics would contend 
that it is just a collection of ad hoc policy decisions with essentially 
post hoc declarations of discretion and vague references to inherent 
authority, rubberstamping—either through the courts or policy an-
nouncements of one sort or another—providing titular legitimization 
for whatever the President or the congressional majority (or some-
times minority) intended to do from the very beginning. The cynical 
view undermines—at least in the field of national security—the 
American fundamental concept that ours is a government of laws 
and not men—a government of principles and not whim, arbitrari-
ness, or caprice. I disagree. 
                                                                                                                      
 * Circuit Judge, United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit. 
Prior to his appointment to the D.C. Circuit in 1987, Judge Sentelle served on the United 
States District Court, Western District of North Carolina, in Ashville. He is a 1968 gradu-
ate of the University of North Carolina Law School. 
 Judge Sentelle delivered these remarks in a speech to the faculty of the Florida State 
University College of Law on March 28, 2003. The Judge thanks Joseph R. Coker for add-
ing footnotes to his Manuscript. 
 1. Here I will give credit to a group of writers in the field of national security law, to 
whom I owe a great debt for much of the organization of my remarks today, Stephen 
Dycus, Arthur L. Berney, William C. Banks, and Peter Raven-Hansen, editors of a national 
security law textbook published by Aspen Law and Business. See NATIONAL SECURITY LAW 
(Stephen Dycus et al. eds., 3d ed. 2002). I also want to credit Retired Colonel Scott Silli-
man, United States Air Force, who is the Director of the Center for Law, Ethics, and Na-
tional Security at Duke University Law School, with whom I have had the good fortune to 
have frequent consultation over the last year and a half about the subject of national secu-
rity.  
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 I am not either naive enough or idealistic enough to assert that 
there is not some element of truth in the cynical view. Nonetheless, I 
think it is significant, indeed crucially important, that the bench, the 
bar, and perhaps especially the legal academy continue to debate the 
legal underpinnings of our nation’s foreign policy, its national secu-
rity policy, and its national defense. Granted, there is a prevalent, 
indeed a respected and perhaps respectable, tradition for the proposi-
tion my country right or wrong. There is, of course, a counter-
tradition of more recent origin, but of disturbing prevalence, espe-
cially in the academy, that my country right or wrong is wrong. The 
proponents, whether self-recognized or not, of each of these views, 
have already made up their minds, without regard to the actual le-
gality of any decision or act of the foreign relations or national secu-
rity, that the acts of the nation are to be defended, applauded, and 
upheld on the one hand, or condemned, denegrated, protested, and 
set aside on the other. Neither of these approaches, however, ex-
plains why, after well over 200 years of national constitutional his-
tory, the American bar, bench, and legal academy continue to ex-
plore, expound, and debate the legitimacy of the acts taken by gov-
ernment in the furtherance of foreign policy and the defense of na-
tional security. That healthier tradition can only be explained and 
understood insofar as it is part of, and obedient to, the tradition of 
the rule of law—even in the confused, constantly changing, and 
frankly dangerous world of national security. 
 With that said, assuming that I am correct that national security 
law is indeed law, What are the subsidiary questions that we should 
be considering within that realm? Is there a legal basis for the use of 
military force in foreign conflict without a declaration of war? This is 
a question that is currently under litigation in the First Circuit, aris-
ing from a lawsuit brought by a number of members of Congress in 
the District Court for Massachusetts, to which the circuit has re-
cently returned the litigation for further proceedings.2 It is a question 
likely to give rise to further litigation in other federal courts.3 
 At the risk of being accused of too much levity in the choice of 
analogy, I would say that this question is in a limited way parallel to 
the subject of romance: Each generation thinks it has discovered it 
                                                                                                                      
 2. See Doe I v. Bush, No. CIV. A. 03-10284-JLT, 2003 WL 21142782 (D. Mass. Feb. 
27, 2003), aff’d, 323 F.3d 133 (1st Cir. 2003). 
 3. Now let me say here at the outset that I do not intend to comment on that or any 
other pending litigation. There are ethical strictures against comment by federal judges on 
pending litigation, whether in our own courts or others, and although I think I am well 
within the exception to that stricture for comment within academic settings, I am not going 
to push the envelope by litigation-specific commentary. I simply wish to put forward for 
academic thought and review, in very sketchy fashion, the history of the controversy. In 
doing so, I recognize that it raises a great many subsidiary questions, at least some of 
which I will raise following some discussion of the general topic.  
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anew, but it has always been with us. We need not look back very far 
to see the political opposition first to President Johnson and then to 
President Nixon on the subject of the Vietnam War. Understand that 
I do not mean the word political in a negative sense, but only in a de-
scriptive or generic one. Before that, a different set of political oppo-
nents questioned with similar seriousness the legitimacy of President 
Truman’s use of force and concomitant domestic powers in the pur-
suit of the Korean conflict.4 But the controversy did not first arise in 
the twentieth century. There have been uses of military force in in-
ternational conflict without declaration of war virtually since the be-
ginning of the Republic.5 To put the question into the framework of 
law, as opposed to political controversy, I would call your attention to 
the case of Bas v. Tingy.6 That decision has the unusual distinction of 
being one of the few decisions of the Supreme Court that still has any 
apparent importance issued before the appointment of Chief Justice 
John Marshall.7 
 In the late eighteenth century, relations between the new nation 
of the United States and the older nation of France had deteriorated 
far more than they have in the last few months. We had reached a 
state of armed conflict, albeit generally limited to conflict on the seas, 
but a conflict which resulted in vessels operating under French colors 
attacking and seizing United States-owned vessels.8 But there was 
no declaration of war. Indeed, the conflict is and was generally re-
ferred to as the Quasi-War.9 Congress passed two acts providing for 
salvage rights of the former owners of the seized United States ves-
sels upon their recapture.10 Captain Tingy was the commander of the 
public armed ship Ganges which had recaptured the Eliza, a ship be-
longing to John Bas, after its capture by a French privateer.11 Tingy 
                                                                                                                      
 4. See John C. Yoo, The Continuation of Politics by Other Means: The Original Un-
derstanding of War Powers, 84 CAL. L. REV. 167, 178 (1996). 
 5. See, e.g., Padilla ex rel. Newman v. Bush, 233 F. Supp. 2d 564, 590 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) 
(“When one considers the sheer number of military campaigns undertaken during this 
country’s history, declarations of war are the exception rather than the rule, beginning 
with the undeclared but Congressionally authorized naval war against France in the 
1790’s . . . .”); see also Abraham D. Sofaer, The Power Over War, 50 U. MIAMI L. REV. 33, 
38–51 (1995) (discussing the early practices of presidential use of force without legislative 
approval).  
 6. 4 U.S. (4 Dall.) 37 (1800). 
 7. To digress for a moment, some time for your own entertainment, go back and pull 
the first four volumes of the United States Reports, now generally published as one and a 
half volumes, and look over the cases. You will not find very much that could be cited as 
precedent for anything that is heard by the Supreme Court or any other federal court to-
day. But that is a digression. 
 8. STANLEY M. ELKINS & ERIC L. MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 643-45 (Ox-
ford University Press 1993). 
 9. See, e.g., Sofaer, supra note 5, at 41.  
 10. Bas, 4 U.S. at 37. 
 11. Id.  
4  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1 
 
brought an action in libel for salvage.12 If the action was governed by 
the 1798 act of Congress, then he was entitled to one-eighth the 
value of the Eliza.13 Under the 1799 act, he was entitled to one-half 
the value.14 The 1798 act referred expressly to recapture from “the 
French.”15 The 1799 act referred to recapture from “the enemy.”16 Al-
though not phrased in precisely the same language we might have 
used in the twentieth or twenty-first century, the issue underlying 
the controversy was: Could there be an enemy in the absence of a 
congressional declaration of war?17 As was the custom in those pre-
Marshall days, there was not an opinion that was literally the opin-
ion of the Court, each justice wrote for himself and the Court entered 
a judgment. Both Justices Bushrod Washington and Samuel Chase 
handed down interesting opinions addressing the undeclared war 
question. In so doing, they laid the foundation for the proposition 
that war may be conducted without a formal declaration of war.  
 Justice Washington stated, “that every contention by force be-
tween two nations, in external matters, under the authority of their 
respective governments, is not only war, but public war.”18 He came 
rather directly to grips with the declaration of war question, stating, 
“[i]f it be declared in form, it is called solemn, and is of the perfect 
kind; because one whole nation is at war with another whole na-
tion.”19 But he went on to insist that, “hostilities may subsist between 
two nations more confined in its nature and extent; being limited as 
to places, persons, and things; and this is more properly termed im-
perfect war; because not solemn . . . . Still, however, it is public 
war.”20 Were they enemies? Well, Justice Washington went on to 
point out that armed vessels of the two nations were combating on 
the high seas in order to subdue each other and make prizes of the 
property of the other. “They certainly were not friends . . . [i]f they 
were not our enemies, I know not what constitutes an enemy.”21  
 Justice Chase phrased his analysis differently. He spoke in terms 
of the difference between Congress declaring a general war and wag-
ing a limited war.22 He set out four acts authorized by the American 
government “demonstrative [of a] state of war.”23 As he observed, by 
                                                                                                                      
 12. Id. 
 13. Id. at 37, 40. 
 14. Id. 
 15. Id. at 40. 
 16. Id. 
 17. See id. at 39.  
 18. Id. at 40. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Id. at 41.  
 22. Id. at 43. 
 23. Id. 
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acts of Congress an American vessel was authorized: (1) to resist 
search by a French public vessel; (2) to capture any vessel that 
should attempt by force to compel submission to a search; (3) to re-
capture any American vessel seized by a French vessel; and (4) to 
capture any French armed vessel found on the high seas.24 Even in 
the absence of a declaration of war, he had “no hesitation in pro-
nouncing, [sic] that a partial war exists between America and 
France.”25 The Court was unanimous. 
 I do not suggest that this single decision of the Supreme Court an-
swers for all time or all circumstances the question of legitimacy of 
undeclared war, but I do suggest that it offers eloquent testimony to 
the antiquity of the question. And so it has gone through our history. 
Five times the United States has fought declared wars: (1) the War of 
1812 against Great Britain; (2) the 1846 war with Mexico; (3) the 
1898 Spanish-American War; (4) World War I beginning in 1917; and 
(5) World War II beginning in 1941.26 Technically, there have been 
eleven declarations of war, because both the world wars involved 
multiple declarations against multiple enemies, but there have been 
only five declared wars.27 But at least ten more times the Comman-
der-in-Chief has committed American troops in extended military 
engagements based upon some authorization by Congress stopping 
short of a formal declaration of war. That would include the unde-
clared naval war with France, the two wars against the Barbary pi-
rates beginning in 1801 and 1815, the raids on the slave traffic in 
1820 to 1823, the operation against Paraguay to seek redress for at-
tack on a naval vessel in 1859, the Lebanese incursion to protect an 
in-place government against insurrection in 1958, the Vietnam War 
from 1964 to 1973, the restoration of the Lebanese government in 
1982, the Gulf War in 1991,28 and the Afghanistan incursion against 
Al Qaeda terrorists following the events of September 11, 2001.29 Add 
to this the current conflict in Iraq,30 the extended undeclared war in 
Korea during the Truman administration, and Clinton’s Bosnian op-
eration—each use arguably authorized under United Nations, au-
thority theretofore legitimated by congressional action31—and we 
                                                                                                                      
 24. Id. at 44. 
 25. Id. at 45. 
 26. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., INSTANCES OF USE OF UNITED 
STATES ARMED FORCES ABROAD, 1798-1999 (1999) [hereinafter USE OF ARMED FORCES]. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. 
 29. U.S. Strikes Afghanistan, WASHINGTON POST, Oct. 8, 2001, at C14; see also Au-
thorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (congressional reso-
lution authorizing the use of force “against those responsible for the recent attacks 
launched against the United States [on September 11, 2001]”). 
 30. RICHARD F. GRIMMETT, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., WAR POWERS RESOLUTION: 
PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE (2003) [hereinafter PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE]. 
 31. See USE OF ARMED FORCES, supra note 26.  
6  FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 31:1 
 
have at least twelve uses of force conducted by the Executive and ap-
proved to a greater or lesser degree by congressional action without 
formal declaration of war. Again, I do not suggest that this answers 
the question of the existence, and certainly not the extent, of the con-
stitutional authority of the United States government, whether in its 
executive or legislative branches, to conduct undeclared war, but I do 
offer it as historic evidence for consideration in any analysis of that 
question. 
 Subsidiary to the question of the constitutionality vel non of unde-
clared war is the question of the relative authority of the executive 
and legislative branches in the conduct of foreign affairs, and specifi-
cally in the management of national security and the conduct of mili-
tary conflict. In what order should we consider them? There are two 
ways of ordering the questions. We might first look to the national 
security powers of Congress since the powers of the legislative 
branch are first addressed in the Constitution.32 Conversely, we 
might consider the Executive first since, historically and currently, 
legitimacy has been questioned more often, indeed far more often, 
with respect to the Commander-in-Chief’s use of armed forces than in 
the area of Congress’s authority to, on the one hand, authorize or, on 
the other, interfere with the President’s claimed authority to author-
ize military action.33 Let us start with the Congress, perhaps because 
it is at least facially an easier realm. I might even suggest answers to 
some questions here. For example, What are the sources in the Con-
stitution for Congress’s authority to deal with national security? The 
plainest source is Section 8 of Article I. That section affords to Con-
gress the general power to “provide for the common Defense . . . of 
the United States.”34 Granted, it may be argued that the very gener-
ality of that introductory language deems it a reliable source for de-
termining a specific grant of power. But specific clauses of that sec-
tion speak with eloquent specificity to the power of Congress to: 
[D]eclare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make 
Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water; To raise and sup-
port Armies . . .; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules 
for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces; 
To provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the 
Union, suppress Insurrections and repel invasions; To provide for 
organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing 
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United 
States . . . .35 
                                                                                                                      
 32. See U.S. CONST. art. I. 
 33. See Yoo, supra note 4, at 170-71. 
 34. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 35. Id. 
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All of these grants of power are amplified by the last paragraph of 
Section 8, the famous Necessary and Proper Clause empowering the 
Congress “[t]o make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for 
carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers 
vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, 
or in any Department or Officer thereof.”36  
 Additionally, might not Sections 9 and 10 of Article I, although 
phrased in terms of limitation, be cited as additional sources of con-
gressional authority? That is, Section 9 provides that “the Privilege 
of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in 
Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the Public Safety may require it.”37 
Could that not be taken as a grant to Congress the power to suspend 
the privilege of a writ of habeas corpus in the case of rebellion or in-
vasion? Granted, that suspension, when it has occurred or been at-
tempted, has generally been at the hands of the executive and not 
the legislature.38 However, does not the placement of Section 9 in ar-
ticle I, the legislative article, rather than Article II, the executive ar-
ticle, suggest an implicit grant to the Congress rather than the Presi-
dent?39  
 As for Section 10, the Constitution provides that “[n]o state shall 
enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of 
Marque and Reprisal.”40 Again, might not the limitation of Section 10 
on the states, especially coupled with the specific grant of the letters 
of marque and reprisal authority in Section 8, strengthen the impli-
cation of congressional primacy in foreign relations and in national 
defense in particular? 
 Even more specifically, in the third paragraph of Section 10, the 
Constitution provides that “No state shall, without the Consent of 
Congress . . . keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter 
into any Agreement or Compact . . . with a foreign Power, or engage 
                                                                                                                      
 36. Id. 
 37. Id. § 9. 
 38. On April 27, 1861, President Lincoln suspended the writ of habeas corpus in re-
sponse to rioting in Baltimore and the burning of several railroad bridges north of Balti-
more, ordered by the Governor of Maryland, to prevent federal troops from entering the 
city. WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, ALL THE LAWS BUT ONE: CIVIL LIBERTIES IN WARTIME 20-25 
(1998). 
 39. In Ex parte Merryman, 17 F. Cas. 144, 148 (C.C.D. Md. 1861) (No. 9487), Chief 
Justice Taney stated that “[t]he clause of the [C]onstitution, which authorizes the suspen-
sion of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is in the 9th section of the first article. 
This article is devoted to the legislative department of the United States, and has not the 
slightest reference to the executive department.” The Chief Justice went on to state that if 
the power to suspend the writ of habeas corpus was intended to be bestowed upon the 
President, “it would undoubtedly be found in [the] plain words in [Article II of the Consti-
tution]; but there is not a word in it that can furnish the slightest ground to justify the ex-
ercise of the power.” Id. at 149. For a discussion of the historical underpinnings of Ex parte 
Merryman, see REHNQUIST, supra note 38, at 26-39.  
 40. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
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in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will 
not admit of delay.”41 The states cannot do that alone. But can they 
not do it with the consent of Congress? And, are these not parallel to 
powers expressly granted to Congress in Section 8? Might one then 
argue that the grants of power to Congress in the field of national de-
fense and national security are broad, numerous, and explicit? 
 Is it a surprise, then, that currently and historically it is almost 
without exception the President who has taken the lead in the com-
mitment of national resources and, specifically, the armed forces in 
the pursuit of national defense and national security? I referred ear-
lier to the five times that the United States has fought wars upon 
congressional declaration of war. I believe it is safe to say that in 
each of those instances Congress acted upon the request of the Presi-
dent, whether it was Monroe, Polk, McKinley, or Franklin D. Roose-
velt. The twelve times in which Presidents have committed troops 
under color of some congressional authorization stopping short of a 
declaration of war have rather obviously begun at presidential insis-
tance, not congressional. This lays aside the fact that there have 
been numerous instances of presidential use of armed forces without 
congressional action. In recent years, including by way of example 
and not exhaustion, President Ford’s use of the armed forces in the 
rescue of the Mayaguez, President Carter’s attempted rescue of the 
hostages in Iran, and President Reagan’s Grenada incursion.42 If 
Congress has all the constitutional grants of power to which I earlier 
alluded, what are the sources of the President’s power to conduct na-
tional defense or national security operations? Again, let us look first 
to the Constitution. 
 First, is it relevant that the Constitution expressly provides that 
the President will take an oath to, inter alia, “preserve, protect and 
defend the Constitution of the United States”?43 Does the wording of 
that oath implicitly suggest that he will use all powers otherwise his 
in that defense? Does that include the power to use the armed forces?  
 More explicitly, Article II, Section 2, provides: “The President 
shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United 
States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the 
actual Service of the United States.”44 Does that simply mean that 
the President is the chief general or admiral, or does it further em-
power him in the use of armed forces for the national defense? 
                                                                                                                      
 41. Id.  
 42. See USE OF ARMED FORCES, supra note 26; see also Yoo, supra note 4, at 181 (dis-
cussing the Mayaguez incident, the attempted hostage rescue in Iran, and the Grenada in-
cursion in calling into question the success of the War Powers Resolution). 
 43. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2. 
 44. Id. 
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 The second paragraph of that same section provides that the 
President “shall have Power . . . to make Treaties.”45 Is it significant 
that the President makes the treaties, while Congress (and only one 
house at that) has only the power to reject or accept what the Presi-
dent has done?46 Even conceding that, over the years, the Senate has 
forced the modification of treaties by conditional ratifications,47 does 
it suggest that the President has primacy in the field of foreign rela-
tions? Is such an assertion of primacy amplified by his power under 
Article II, Section 2, to appoint ambassadors and other public minis-
ters and consuls, and especially by his power under Article II, Sec-
tion 3, to “receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers [from 
other countries]” to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed 
[without reservation for any congressional primacy in defense or in-
ternational relations] and . . . [to] Commission all the Officers of the 
United States”?48 
 Aside from those explicit grants of power to the President, are 
there other sources for an executive claim to national security pow-
ers? Note that Presidential Counsel Lloyd Cutler, on behalf of Presi-
dent Carter,49 Central Intelligence Associate Counsel Mitchell Rogo-
vin, on behalf of President Reagan,50 and various other presidential 
counsel, attorneys general, secretaries of relevant departments, and 
other executive officials including the presidents themselves, have 
asserted such claims throughout history. What other sources of pub-
lic power might there be for presidential assertion of authority in the 
field of national security? Do the explicit powers in Article II of the 
Constitution carry with them the implication of more power? We 
might refer generally to the powers in Article II as the President’s 
commander-in-chief powers, foreign relations powers, and executive 
powers. Do those fragmented powers create a whole that is greater 
than the sum of their parts? Are there other powers, perhaps what 
we might call emergency powers, that are inherent in that branch of 
government, which has to see to the execution of law, while Congress 
is generally charged with the making of laws, and was, at least in the 
                                                                                                                      
 45. Id.  
 46. Id. 
 47. See generally Kevin C. Kennedy, Conditional Approval of Treaties by the U.S. 
Senate, 19 LOY. L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 89, 95-122 (1997) (discussing the frequency of 
conditional ratification of treaties by the Senate and the general types of conditions that 
are placed on ratification).  
 48. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2; id. § 3.  
 49. See Peter E. Quint, The Separation of Powers Under Carter, 62 TEX. L. REV. 785, 
811 n.132 (1984). 
 50. See Peter Raven-Hansen & William C. Banks, Pulling the Purse Strings of the 
Commander in Chief, 80 VA. L. REV. 833, 904 (1994) (citing the statement of Mitchell 
Rogovin before the House Select Committee on Intelligence for the proposition that Presi-
dents have claimed authority, under their powers over foreign affairs, to conduct some 
military operations without congressional approval).  
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eighteenth century, expected to be in session only a rather small part 
of the time? If there are inherent and emergency powers, how broad 
are these powers? 
 I would be remiss at this point if I did not note, at least as a sig-
nificant aside, that the Supreme Court has discussed these questions 
in various forms and at various times. I think it would be generally 
conceded that the most comprehensive and, at the same time, the 
most fundamental analysis by the Supreme Court can be found in 
the fragmented opinion of the Court in Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. 
v. Sawyer51 (commonly known as the Steel Seizure Case). I will not 
attempt to cover that case to exhaustion in this aside.52  
 In the Steel Seizure Case, as you may recall, President Truman, 
acting under rather general grants of authority related to the de-
ployment of U.S. forces to Korea, actually seized steel mills.53 The 
whole litigation is about his authority to do so. The acting Attorney 
General, arguing at the court of appeals level, took the inherent au-
thority concept to its extreme—arguing that the President by virtue 
of the vesting of the Executive power in him under Article II, inher-
ited all the Executive authority of the crown at the time of the Decla-
ration of Independence.54 Is there an inherent authority extending 
that far? Hint: The United States did not make that argument in the 
Supreme Court. Was it a silly argument? Perhaps, but just fifteen 
years earlier, in United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., the 
Supreme Court had joined seven-to-one in an opinion by Justice 
Sutherland that described the federal government as having all pow-
ers of external sovereignty and declaring that “the President alone 
has the power to speak or listen as a representative of the nation,” 
based in part on a similar theory.55 Does that argument have validity 
today? Note: Justice Sutherland quoted John Marshall as stating 
“[t]he President is the sole organ of the nation in its external rela-
tions, and its sole representative with foreign nations.”56 That was 
John Marshall. Does that strengthen the argument any today? Well, 
perhaps the President is the nation’s sole representative with the 
foreign nations, but is he the sole agent when we look to national de-
fense and the conduct of national security operations, specifically 
                                                                                                                      
 51. 343 U.S. 579 (1952). 
 52. It takes me two hours in a seminar course to come anywhere close to an exhaus-
tive treatment, and it is a principle theme to the National Security Law text to which I ear-
lier alluded, see Dycus, et al., supra note 1, as well as most other writing on the question of 
presidential authority, even that which is not limited to national security law. But back to 
the questions about the President’s authority.  
 53. Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 582-83.  
 54. See William H. Rehnquist, Constitutional Law and Public Opinion, 20 SUFFOLK 
U. L. REV. 751, 759-60 (1986).  
 55. 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936). 
 56. Id. at 319 (internal quotes omitted).  
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war? Hint: Justice Sutherland was cheating when he quoted Mar-
shall. Marshall was not on the Supreme Court at the time he made 
the statement; he was a member of Congress arguing (successfully) 
that President Adams had not committed an impeachable offense by 
turning over to the British for trial a British subject charged with 
murder in his own country.57 Note: Adams was acting pursuant to the 
Jay Treaty that Congressman Marshall had helped to negotiate. 
 Back to the more fundamental questions: What is the power of the 
President to use troops without a declaration of war, or to commit 
troops to undeclared operations without specific congressional au-
thorization? Can it be seriously contended that he does not have the 
emergency power to commit troops if we are actually invaded, or if 
there is an actual insurrection, for example, if the State of South 
Carolina fires on Fort Sumter? Aside from those emergencies, or per-
haps even including them, what is the effect and what is the legiti-
macy of the War Powers Resolution?  
 In 1973, Congress passed the War Powers Resolution for the ex-
press purpose of “fulfill[ing] the intent of the framers of the Constitu-
tion and insur[ing] that the collective judgment of both the Congress 
and the President will apply to the introduction of United States 
Armed Forces into hostilities.”58 It requires, inter alia, that the Presi-
dent shall “in every possible instance . . . consult with Congress be-
fore” sending armed forces into hostilities or situations of imminent 
hostility, and regularly until the armed forces are no longer so en-
gaged.59 Section 4 of the Resolution60 deals expressly with the use of 
armed forces without a declaration of war and requires the President 
within 48 hours after the introduction of forces into hostilities to 
submit a report to the Speaker of the House and the President Pro 
Tem of the Senate setting forth the circumstances necessitating the 
introduction of armed forces, the constitutional or legislative author-
ity under which such introduction took place, and the estimated 
scope and duration of the hostilities involved.61 It further requires 
that at least once every six months thereafter he report periodically 
                                                                                                                      
 57. H. Jefferson Powell, The Founders and the President’s Authority Over Foreign Af-
fairs, 40 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1471, 1511-12 (1999); see also LEONARD BAKER, JOHN MAR-
SHALL, A LIFE IN LAW 318-23 (1974). Note that President Adams was acting pursuant to 
the Jay Treaty, of which John Marshall was a key public supporter in 1895. For an over-
view of the negotiation, ratification, and subsequent public discourse over the John Jay 
Treaty, see id. at 201-12.  
 58. 50 U.S.C. § 1541(a) (2003).  
 59. Id. § 1542. 
 60. War Powers Resolution, Pub. L. No. 93-148, 87 Stat. 555 (1973) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. §1543 (2000)). 
 61. Id. 
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to the Congress on the status of the hostilities as well as the scope 
and duration.62 
 Section 5 of the Resolution63 requires, inter alia, that within 60 
days after the submission of a report or after the date upon which 
such report is required, the President is to 
[T]erminate any use of United States Armed Forces with respect to 
which such report was submitted . . . unless the Congress (l) has 
declared war or has enacted a specific authorization for such use of 
United States Armed Forces, (2) has extended by law such sixty-
day period, or (3) is physically unable to meet as a result of an 
armed attack upon the United States.64 
 I believe it is correct to state that every President since the en-
actment of the Resolution has expressed misgivings about the Reso-
lution, conspicuously including Gerald Ford, the most legislative man 
to serve as the Chief Executive during the twentieth century. How-
ever, Presidents have generally complied with it.65 But they have 
done so, as Ford declared in the John Sherman Cooper Lectures after 
his presidency, without conceding that it is constitutional or bind-
ing.66 Ford said he consulted with the Congress simply because he 
thought it was common sense and it would strengthen the trust be-
tween the executive and legislative branches.67 With that said, I 
think we are left with two broad questions, perhaps covering many 
subsidiary ones. These two broad questions are among those that I 
do not purport to answer. The first is based on the assertion of some 
presidentialists that this Resolution is an unconstitutional congres-
sional usurpation of the President’s Executive, Commander-in-Chief, 
or inherent power. Are they correct? Some legislative proponents 
have argued that the Resolution is not only constitutional, but that it 
is enacting constitutional requirements, that is, that even in the ab-
sence of the Resolution the President would be required to seek con-
gressional authorization (perhaps not on precisely these strict sched-
ules set out in the Resolution) and to cease operations if not congres-
sionally authorized. Is that a valid argument? I did not say I would 
ask only easy questions, I did say that I would not be expressing 
opinions on many of them. The War Powers Resolution is one of those 
areas in which I will not be expressing an opinion.  
                                                                                                                      
 62. Id. 
 63. Id. § 5. 
 64. Id. 
 65. See PRESIDENTIAL COMPLIANCE, supra note 30, at 11-13.  
 66. See President Gerald R. Ford, The War Powers Resolution, Alfred M. Landon Lec-
tures on Public Issues given at Kansas State University (Feb. 20, 1978), available at 
http://www.ford.utexas.edu/library/speeches/780220.htm (last visited Aug. 14, 2003).  
 67. Id. 
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 The next question I would raise, and the last one on this level of 
generality is, do the courts have a role in national security law? After 
all, the Constitution does provide that “the judicial Power shall ex-
tend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution 
[and] the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made . . . under 
their Authority.”68 If I am correct that national security law is indeed 
law, does that not presuppose that we have a role? Are we not, after 
all, the branch charged with the duty of saying what the law is?  
 Certainly we have some role in such specific areas as the limita-
tions on Executive and perhaps Legislative authority to, for example, 
conduct surveillance together prior to requiring intelligence informa-
tion. In the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act (FISA) of 1978, 
Congress has created a whole special court staffed by district judges 
selected by the Chief Justice to pass upon applications for and issue 
orders permitting the use of electronic surveillance (including wire-
taps) to obtain foreign intelligence information.69 That court has ex-
ercised its power ever since. Under the original act, the wording of 
the statute was such that the court understood it to be its duty to de-
termine that the wiretaps were not used in the furtherance of crimi-
nal investigations, otherwise put, that the gathering of foreign intel-
ligence was “the purpose” of the electronic surveillance.70 In the Pa-
triot Act Amendment to the statute after the tragedies of September 
11, the statute recited that the gathering of foreign intelligence must 
be “a significant purpose.”71 The FISA Court held that it was consti-
tutionally required to insure that the foreign intelligence gathering 
remained the primary purpose72 and that the wiretaps did not be-
come a shortcut to criminal investigation in cases in which a Title III 
wiretap order might not be available.73 For the first time in the his-
tory of the court, its judgment was appealed.74 FISA had created a 
foreign intelligence surveillance court of review.75 My colleague Sen-
ior Judge Laurence Silberman sits on that court. Until the Patriot 
Act Amendment case,76 the review court had never sat. In its first 
and, to date, only opinion, it reversed the FISA court and held that 
the foreign intelligence wiretap could indeed be used in furtherance 
                                                                                                                      
 68. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 69. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783 
(codified at 50 U.S.C. § 1801, et seq. (2002)). 
 70. See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, 
218 F. Supp. 2d 611, 619-20 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. 2002). 
 71. U.S.A. Patriot Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 Stat. 291 (2001) (codified at 50 
U.S.C. § 1804(a)(7)(B) (2003)).  
 72. See In re All Matters Submitted to the Foreign Surveillance Court, 218 F. Supp. 
2d at 622. 
 73. See id. at 623.  
 74. See In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d 717, 719 (Foreign Int. Surv. Ct. Rev. 2002).  
 75. 50 U.S.C.A. § 1803(b) (2003). 
 76. In re Sealed Case, 310 F.3d at 719-20.  
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of criminal investigations so long as the gathering of foreign intelli-
gence was a purpose of the tap.77 
 Whether you agree with the FISA court or the review court, that 
case illustrates the principal role which courts must be conceded to 
play in national security. We must function like courts. We must, in 
cases properly brought before us and properly within our jurisdiction, 
enter appropriate orders and judgments for relief when the political 
branches, acting under the color of national security powers, have 
unconstitutionally or otherwise unlawfully invaded the civil rights of 
citizens or persons within our jurisdiction. Have we always per-
formed that role well? Ask that question of Korematsu and the other 
Japanese Americans who were driven from their homes and interned 
during World War II. I am not passing on the policy question behind 
what Roosevelt or the others did in those acts, but if you have never 
read the Korematsu case,78 read it and reflect sometime on whether 
the courts functioned very well in our conceded role in national secu-
rity of adjudicating the question raised by the invasions of civil rights 
by the political branches in the national security context. I hasten to 
say that I am not suggesting that the Executive and the Legislative 
branches cannot do things in emergencies which would be unconsti-
tutional without the emergency. I am simply raising this question, 
and this is one upon which I am venturing an answer: Do the courts 
not still have a duty to pass on the constitutionality of what the other 
branches have done? What sort of questions does that duty raise to-
day? Is the concept of a military tribunal constitutional as a method 
of adjudicating crimes? If so, who can those tribunals try? Can they 
try American citizens? Can they try American citizens for acts 
abroad but not domestic? I can answer none of these today, but I as-
sume that I and other judges will have to answer these and a great 
many more questions in days to come. The bar and the legal academy 
must be prepared to defend on the one hand the civil rights of the 
citizens of our country, and, on the other hand, the legitimate pre-
rogatives of the government of this country. When the line between 
those two is not clear, does not constitutional duty impose a role 
upon the judiciary in national security affairs?  
 More controversially, back to the first question of whether and to 
what extent the President may commit troops without congressional 
declaration of war, and even without congressional authorization, Is 
that a political question which the courts ought not address? The Su-
preme Court has not had occasion to provide a definitive answer to 
that question, nor will I attempt to do so. I will say briefly that the 
lower courts which have addressed the question cannot be accused of 
                                                                                                                      
 77. Id. at 735-36.  
 78. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
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unanimity. In Ange v. Bush,79 a district judge passed on a challenge 
to the President’s deployment of U.S. military forces in the Persian 
Gulf. The government defended in part on the political question the-
ory.80 Judge Lamberth reviewed the six factors enumerated by the 
Supreme Court in Baker v. Carr, for determining whether a question 
is a political one: 
[A] textually demonstrable constitutional commitment . . . to a co-
ordinate political department or a lack of judicially discoverable 
and manageable standards for resolving it; or the impossibility of 
deciding without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly 
for non-judicial discretion; or the impossibility of a court’s under-
taking independent resolution without expressing lack of respect 
due coordinate branches . . . or an unusual need for unquestioning 
adherence to a political decision already made; or the potentiality 
of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by various 
departments on one question.81  
 Judge Lamberth found the question of the commitment of armed 
forces to be a political question under the textually demonstrable 
commitment of war powers to the political branches, the due respect 
theory, and the lack of judicial equipment to enter the field.82 In do-
ing so, he took precedent from Harisiades v. Shaughnessy.83 It cannot 
be said, however, that the Harisiades case, while certainly a legiti-
mate precedent for Judge Lamberth’s reasoning, was in any way con-
trolling. It dealt with a much more narrow question outside the area 
of the use of forces, specifically the constitutionality of deporting a 
legal resident alien because of his membership in the Communist 
Party.84 Not only could Judge Lamberth not find a controlling prece-
dent, but on the same date that he issued his decision in Ange v. 
Bush, another judge of the District of Columbia District Court, Judge 
Harold Greene, issued Dellums v. Bush,85 passing on a challenge to 
the constitutionality of the same deployment brought by members of 
Congress in which he determined that the question was not a politi-
cal question outside judicial competence.86 He did not, however, rule 
in favor of the plaintiffs, rejecting the suit on standing grounds.87 No 
higher court has conclusively resolved the conflict. 
 Is the question a political one on which we cannot act? I already 
telegraphed my stance. I am not going to answer it unless and until I 
                                                                                                                      
 79. 752 F. Supp. 509 (D.D.C. 1990). 
 80. See id. at 511-15.  
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meet it in an Article III context. These are but a few of the questions 
that face the bench, the bar, and the legal academy in the field of na-
tional security law today, and while I have not attempted to answer 
many of them, I will come out where I came in. The very fact that we 
are asking these questions is strong evidence that national security 
law is law: that the United States conducts its foreign affairs under 
the rule of law. Has the United States done so perfectly for its entire 
history? Of course not. Humans have not done anything perfectly, 
nor may we expect perfection in this century. But we keep asking 
these questions. And when it becomes appropriate, when it becomes 
necessary, we answer them. 
 
